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Abstract23
This research explores the possibility that a person’s (perceiver’s) prospects of24
making a correct inference of another person’s (target’s) inner states depends on the25
personal characteristics of the target, potentially relating to how readable they are.26
Twenty-seven targets completed the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and were classified as27
having low, average or high EQ. They were unobtrusively videoed while thinking of28
an event of happiness, gratitude, anger and sadness. After observing targets thinking29
of such a past event, fifty-two perceivers (participants) in Study 1 were asked to infer30
what the target was thinking, and fifty perceivers in Study 2 were asked to rate the31
target’s expression – positive or negative. Results suggested that (1) perceivers’32
accuracy in detecting targets’ thoughts depended on which EQ group the target33
belonged to, and (2) target readability is not a proxy measure for level of target34
expressiveness. In other words, something about EQ status renders targets more or35
less easy to read in a way that is not simply explained by expressive people being36
more readable. We conclude with discussion of the importance of the target’s trait as37
well as situation they experience in determining how accurately a perceiver might38
infer their inner states.39
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Accurate inferences of others’ thoughts depend on where they stand on45
the empathic trait continuum46
Mindreading (known otherwise as mentalizing, empathic accuracy) refers to47
people’s (perceivers’) ability to infer what another person (the target) might think,48
feel, and know for the purpose of interpreting and predicting their behavior (Premack49
& Woodruff, 1978; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 1993). Past research on mindreading has50
explored people’s ability to infer others’ mental states (e.g., Cassidy Ropar, Mitchell,51
& Chapman, 2013, 2015; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; Pillai,52
Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2012; Pillai et al., 2014; Sheppard, Pillai, Wong, Ropar, &53
Mitchell, 2016; Wimmer & Perner, 1983); but much of this research largely ignores54
the characteristics of the target – the person we are making inferences about55
(Andrews, 2008; Rai & Mitchell, 2004; Wu, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2016a, 2016b) --56
as if we only need to focus on the features of the situation in order to explain57
mindreading. The empirical work reported here is novel in seeking to explore the58
possibility that some aspects of target traits might affect how accurately we make59
mental state inferences. Specifically, further investigation is needed that focuses on60
our accuracy in interpreting signals in natural, spontaneous target behaviour, taking61
into account that the target behaviour (and therefore the signal available for62
mindreading) will depend on individual differences in the targets, potentially63
measurable by where they stand on a trait continuum. This research will thus64
illuminate how accuracy in attributing inner states to others depends on considering65
their personality traits – something that has been largely overlooked to date.66
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Previous studies have suggested that perceivers are able to infer which situation67
caused a target’s reaction (Cassidy et al., 2013, 2015; Pillai et al., 2012, 2014;68
Sheppard et al., 2016; Teoh, Wallis, Stephen, & Mitchell, 2017; Kang, Anthoney, &69
Mitchell, 2017) even though the particular situation experienced by the target70
provokes a range of reactions across different targets. Worldly events occurring in a71
given situation (e.g. something that happened to the target, something that the target72
witnessed or heard) evoke a mental state which in turn gives rise to a signal in the73
target that is potentially observable to a perceiver (Sheppard et al., 2016; Teoh et al.,74
2017; Valanides, Sheppard, & Mitchell, 2017). According to Teoh et al (2017), the75
information available to the perceiver is the target’s behaviour (which is signalling76
something about the target’s mind) and from this the perceiver makes a backwards77
inference to the underlying target mental state (the proximal cause of the target’s78
behaviour – Kang, Schneider, Schweinberger, & Mitchell, 2018) and the perceiver79
then makes a further backwards inference to the event that evoked the target mental80
state (the distal cause). This process of ‘retrodictive mindreading’ (Gallese &81
Goldman, 1998; Teoh et al., 2017) confers considerable benefits in that we can exploit82
our ability to read others’ minds to know various things in the world, including some83
things that cannot be apprehended through our ordinary senses. The current study thus84
was built on the framework of ‘retrodiction’, by which we explored accuracy in85
thought inferences from spontaneous target behaviour, in relation with the86
characteristics of the targets (where they stand on the empathy trait continuum).87
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Note, however, there is no precise correspondence between the particular form of88
target behavior and the event that triggered the reaction (Zaki & Ochsner, 2011;89
Russell, Bachorowski, & Fernandez-Dols, 2003). It is not the case, for instance, that90
when targets listened to an unfortunate story they reliably looked concerned91
(sometimes they looked amused, sometimes indifferent, sometimes bored, Pillai et al.,92
2012, 2014). The range of target reactions is linked causally with the situation or93
state, and while seldom acknowledged in previous research, it seems the particular94
reaction within that range is explained by the characteristics of the target. Thus,95
accounts of mindreading would be more comprehensive and useful if they recognised96
that perceivers (1) have to work with individual differences in how a target’s signalled97
mind is displayed while (2) appreciating that the particular domain of inner state98
being experienced by the target nevertheless constrains the range of their reactions.99
A small number of recent studies have begun exploring how characteristics of the100
target impact upon the perceiver’s accuracy in mindreading. Studies conducted by101
Zaki, Bolger and Ochsner (2008, 2009) suggest that the target’s level of expressivity102
is a significant predictor of perceiver performance in inferring how the target felt.103
Another recent study was conducted by Sheppard et al (2016), in which perceivers104
(participants) were asked to identify which of four events the target had experienced105
after viewing a short mute video of the target. Results suggested that that perceivers106
were more effective in detecting the minds of neurotypical targets than targets with107
autism spectrum disorder (ASD); though they rated ASD targets equally expressive as108
neurotypical targets, suggesting targets with ASD were expressive in a different way,109
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a way that was difficult for perceivers to interpret. In short, the behaviour that reflects110
the signalled mind might be easier to ‘read’ in some targets than in others. Yet, to our111
knowledge, no study has directly examined how individual differences in target112
characteristics determine perceiver effectiveness in detecting specific target states of113
mind.114
Relevant to this matter, Wu et al (2016a) discovered that it was easier for115
perceivers, after watching a brief sample of behaviour, to identify targets located at116
the extremities of the continuum of empathic trait than it was to identify targets117
located in the middle of the continuum. Wu et al speculated that targets located at118
various points along the continuum might possess minds that vary in their level of119
readability (how easily a perceiver could infer their inner states). For example, a120
person who is unusually low in empathy (an extreme case being autism) might signal121
mental states quite differently than those closer to the middle of the empathic trait122
continuum (Brewer et al, 2016; Faso, Sasson, & Pinkham, 2015; Sheppard et al,123
2016). According to Wu et al (2016a, 2017), targets located at empathic trait and big-124
five trait extremities were easy to identify as being low or high on trait continua.125
Accuracy in inferring another’s mental states might depend on characteristic aspects126
of targets (Andrews, 2008; Zaki et al., 2008). The purpose of the current research was127
to test whether or not targets vary in how readable they are depending on where they128
stand on the empathy continuum.129
We adapted a procedure of ‘retrodictive mindreading,’ that was used previously130
(Pillai et al., 2012, 2014; Cassidy et al., 2013, 2015; Teoh et al., 2017; Valanides et131
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al., 2017; Kang et al., 2017), in which the perceiver “makes a backward inference132
from the observed action to a hypothesized goal state” (Gallese & Goldman, 1998,133
p.497). The target was asked to think of something in the past that caused them to134
experience a particular state, where we assume the target’s visible behaviour is an135
externalization of their inner thoughts (Faso et al., 2015; Valanides et al., 2017).136
Perceivers were then asked to infer what the targets had been instructed to think about137
(Valanides et al., 2017). Importantly, we the researchers knew independently what138
targets had been asked to think (one of four kinds of event), allowing us to compare139
perceiver judgments of the target’s inner state against an objective fact, thus satisfying140
West and Kenny’s (2011) ‘truth condition’. The accuracy of perceivers’ inferences of141
targets’ inner states can thus be measured objectively as a matter of fact.142
Study 1143
Method144
Based on the procedure developed by Valanides et al (2017) in which targets145
were cued to think about either positive or negative events they had experienced, in146
Study 1 targets were filmed while thinking of four autobiographical events, including147
those that led to positive feelings and those that led to negative feelings. Targets were148
classified into three groups according to their empathic trait measurable with the149
Empathy Quotient (EQ, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004; Baron-Cohen, 2012):150
Low EQ, Average EQ and High EQ. We persevered with the trait of empathy in this151
research (1) to be consistent with the previous findings in empathic trait judgment152
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(Wu et al., 2016a) and (2) because extremities of this trait might be associated with a153
state that is less easy to read (Sheppard et al., 2016).154
Perceivers were tasked with inferring which of the four events (a happy event, an155
event that provoked gratitude, a sad event, and an event that provoked anger) the156
target was thinking about after watching a short silent video of the target. The study157
tested: (1) how well perceivers inferred the thoughts of the targets; (2) whether158
accuracy in inferring the target thoughts varies depending on which EQ group the159
target belonged to.160
Participants161
Fifty-two college students (25 males; M = 20.67 years) in Guangzhou and162
Zhanjiang China participated as perceivers in exchange for monetary compensation.163
Sample size was calculated using the software G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, &164
Buchner, 2009), affording 95% power to detect a medium effect on the within-165
subjects factors and 94% power to detect a large effect on the interaction . Perceivers166
were shown photographs of the targets and were included only if they reported not167
having seen any of the targets previously. Two additional females were acquainted168
with one or more targets and were excluded.169
Materials170
Video stimuli collection and editing. Videos were collected from 27 college171
students (targets, 15 females, M = 21 years), recruited in exchange for monetary172
compensation. All had responded to a call to do a screen test advertising the173
university and to complete questionnaires, and they also were informed they needed174
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to talk of some experiences about themselves before the screen test. One additional175
male target was excluded due to a technical problem.176
Targets were individually videoed in a quiet laboratory with a Sony Handycam177
HDR-SR12 video camera mounted on a tripod placed approximately 1.5 meters away178
to record the target’s face and the top part of their body. The target sat at a desk facing179
the camera and the researcher sat opposite but out of view of the camera. Unknown to180
the target, the camera automatically began recording as soon as the target entered the181
room. At the end, before leaving the laboratory, all targets were fully debriefed and182
gave written informed consent to use the videos for research purposes.183
On arrival, targets were issued with a consent form and an information sheet that184
outlined the tasks they would perform, and were informed they would only be videoed185
while doing the screen test. Once inside the laboratory, after they read the information186
sheet and signed the consent form, the researcher began with a brief conversation.187
After that, the target was asked to think of a specified past event and then talk about188
the experience. Each target repeated this exercise for six past experiences in total,189
including a happy experience, an experience that led to a feeling of gratitude, an angry190
experience, a sad experience, an experience of having breakfast and doing a routine191
activity during the weekend – the latter two were filler activities. The focal192
experiences (happy, gratitude, anger, sadness) included two of positive valence and193
tow of negative valence, but other than that the experiences were not pre-validated194
with respect to emotional distinctiveness from each other. The order of the195
experiences was counterbalanced across the targets. The target was asked to spend196
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about 1 minute silently recalling each experience before talking about it.197
Subsequently, the target was asked to read the script of promotional material to the198
camera after the researcher ostensibly switched to ‘record mode’. This ‘cover story’199
of examining whether the target might be talented in promoting the university gave200
legitimacy to the presence of the camera.201
Four separate video clips of each target including thinking of the four emotional202
events (happy, grateful, angry and sad) were used in this study, making 108 videos in203
total (27 targets × 4 videos per target). The average duration of the video clips was204
21.33 s (SD = 10.24; ranging from 7 s to 38 s) for the Happiness, 23.85 s for the205
Gratitude (SD = 5.88, ranging from 6 s to 30 s), 21.26 s (SD = 8.36; ranging from 7 s206
to 34 s) for the Anger, and 22.33 s for the Sadness (SD = 9.10; ranging from 6 s to 35207
s). A one-way repeated-measures ANOVA (F (3, 78) = .70, p = .554) did not detect208
any difference between the mean duration of the videoclips of the four events.209
Empathy Quotient (EQ). Following a short break for a couple of minutes, the210
target filled in the Empathy Quotient (EQ, Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). The211
EQ questionnaire offers a comprehensive measurement of the trait structure of212
empathy. It comprises 40 items (along with 20 filter items) pertaining to a range of213
behaviours associated with empathizing, with an overall rating that is useful in214
determining individual differences in empathic trait. All targets completed the215
Chinese translated version of the EQ questionnaire (adopted from the website:216
http://www.autismresearchcentre.com/arc/default.asp).217
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Target EQ scores ranged from 12 to 64 (M = 37.52, SD = 14.45). A score in the218
range of 0-32 is low EQ and 11 targets were in this category, 33-52 is average and 10219
targets were in this category, 53-63 is above average and 5 targets were in this220
category, and 64-80 is high and 1 target was in this category (Baron-Cohen, 2012).221
Following Wu et al (2016a) we combined the ‘above average’ and ‘high’ categories222
into one range from 53 to 80 that was re-labeled as a category of high EQ. We then223
grouped the targets into three EQ categories, with 11 in the Low EQ Group (4 males),224
10 in the Average EQ group (5 males), and 6 in High EQ group (3 males).225
Procedure226
Perceivers were tested individually. A set of 108 target videos (27 targets each227
contributing 4 videos) was displayed in random order to each perceiver using E-Prime228
Version 2.0.8.22. In each trial, following a fixation cross (‘+’) presented for 800 ms,229
one video clip was displayed; after that, a response screen appeared, presenting a230
four-forced choice in a fixed order as response options ((1) an angry event, (2) a231
happy event, (3) a sad event and (4) a grateful event). The perceiver registered his/her232
inference of the target’s thoughts by using the keyboard to select the number ‘1, 2, 3233
or 4’ for the corresponding options. After the perceiver made the choice the screen234
moved to the fixation cross in preparation for the next trial. Responses were235
automatically recorded by the software for later retrieval. Perceivers typically needed236
about 45 minutes to complete the task.237
Results238
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Given that signal detection theory (SDT) allows assessment of accuracy and239
sensitivity that is immune to response bias (the tendency to select one category more240
frequently than another; Macmillan, 2002; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005), it is widely241
applied to measure performance across various tasks, such as accuracy in trait242
judgments (Wu et al., 2016; Wu et al., 2017) and mental state inferences (Pillai et al.,243
2012, 2014; Valanides et al., 2017; Kang, et al., 2017). We thus adopted SDT to244
compute participant accuracy (sensitivity) in inferring the thoughts of targets.245
According to guidelines on calculating SDT (Macmillan, 2002; Macmillan &246
Creelman, 2005), a correct judgment that a target thought about a particular event247
counted as a ‘hit’ while an incorrect judgment that a target recalled the same event248
counted as a false alarm. Performance of participants across the different target EQ249
groups over a total of 27 trials for each state was characterised as single values for250
each perceiver in the form of d-prime (d’) for assessing perceiver accuracy in251
inferring each state. Following Macmillan and Creelman (2005), where the number of252
hits (or false alarms) was 0, 0.5 was added and the hit rate (or false alarm rate) was253
then calculated; where the participant made the maximum number of hits or false254
alarms for a given state, 0.5 was subtracted from the number of hits or false alarms255
prior to calculating the hit rate or false alarm rate. The d’ was then calculated by256
subtracting the z-score of the false alarm rate from the z-score of the hit rate (d’ = Z257
(hit rate) – Z (false alarm rate), where function Z (p), 0 ≤ p ≤1). In addition, according 258
to SDT outlined by Macmillan and Creelman (2005), we represent the base-rate as the259
‘criterion’ (c) for choosing any particular response category with the statistic c: the260
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more negative the value of c, the more perceivers were in favour of choosing this261
particular category, irrespective of whether correct; but when c is more positive, it262
implies perceivers were against choosing the particular category, meaning they were263
conservative in this case. Criterion c was calculated by -0.5 x (Z (false alarm rate) + Z264
(hit rate)).265
Table 1 shows the means of hit rate (MHR), false alarm rate (MFAR), d-prime (Md’)266
and criterion (Mc) of each mental state in each target EQ group, along with t values of267
one-sample t tests of each Md’ where the comparison value is zero: If perceivers were268
unable to infer each of the four target thoughts, this would yield a Md’ of zero for that269
thought. According to the results of one-sample t tests for each Md’ presented in Table270
1, perceivers were able to detect what targets were thinking when they were recalling271
either a happy or sad event across the three target EQ groups. Yet, perceivers were not272
equally effective in inferring a given thought, as shown in Table 1 and Figure 1.273
Specifically, perceivers were notably accurate in inferring the states of happiness and274
gratitude for targets with low EQ but had difficulty in inferring these two positive275
states when the targets had high EQ. In addition, perceivers were effective in inferring276
sadness in the high EQ group and inferring happiness in the average EQ group.277
Table 1 & Figure 1 here278
A repeated-measures ANOVA (with the three target EQ groups and the four279
mental states as the within-subjects factors) confirmed the results displayed in Figure280
1: There were main effects related with the three target EQ groups (F (2, 102) = 9.94,281
p < .001, Cohen’s f = .44) and the four mental states (F (3, 153) = 4.58, p = .004,282
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Cohen’s f = .30), and a significant interaction between the two factors (Greenhouse-283
Geisser adjusted F (4.96, 253.06) = 14.50, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .53).284
Simple-effects analyses for the interaction between Target EQ Group and the285
States revealed the following results. Firstly, the main effects of the four states were286
found in both the low (F (3, 153) = 14.07, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .52) and the high EQ287
groups (F (3, 153) = 14.39, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .53) but not in the average EQ group288
(F (3, 153) = 1.15, p = .330). According to post hoc LSD tests, in the low EQ group,289
perceivers were most accurate in detecting the thought of happiness compared with290
the other target states (ps ≤ .003), while in the high EQ group, perceivers were more 291
accurate in inferring sadness compared with the two positive states (ps < .001).292
Secondly, except for the thought of anger (F (2, 102) = .84, p = .435), main293
effects associated with the three other states were significant across the three target294
EQ groups (Happiness: Green-house Geisser adjusted F (1.67, 85.33) = 38.70, p295
< .001, Cohen’s f = .74; Gratitude: F (2, 102) = 12.52, p < .001, Cohen’s f = .49;296
Sadness: Green-house Geisser adjusted F (1.70, 86.43) = 3.28, p = .050, Cohen’s f297
= .25). Post hoc LSD tests revealed the following: (1) perceivers were most accurate298
in inferring happiness when the targets were low in EQ (ps < .001) and least accurate299
when the targets had high EQ (ps < .001); (2) perceivers were least accurate in300
detecting gratitude in the high EQ group (ps < .001); (3) perceivers more accurately301
inferred sadness in the high EQ group than in the low EQ group (p = .041). In302
summary, how accurately perceivers inferred target thoughts depended on the EQ303
scales the targets belonged to and on what targets had been asked to think about.304
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As demonstrated in Table 1, it seemed perceivers adopted different criteria (Mc)305
when inferring what events the targets were thinking. A repeated-measures ANOVA306
(with the four states as the within-subjects factor) for the Mc across the three target307
EQ groups confirmed the results in Table 1: F (3, 153) = 14.84, p < .001, Cohen’s f308
= .53. Post hoc LSD revealed the mean c associated with sadness was significantly309
lower than the mean c associated with the other three states (ps < .001), suggesting310
that generally perceivers were inclined to judge targets were thinking about a sad311




Study 1 demonstrated that perceivers were generally able to detect the thoughts of316
happy and sad events, and the accuracy in inferring target thoughts depended on317
where the target stood on the empathic trait continuum and on which event the target318
was cued to think about. While the targets were recalling experiences, signals to their319
inner states perhaps leaked out to a greater or lesser degree, such as smiling or320
frowning. According to Soscia (2007), the happy and grateful events should arouse321
positive inner states, and the angry and sad events should arouse negative inner states.322
Thus, one might ask whether perceivers (in Study 1) were merely classifying target323
expressions as positive or negative (Kang et al., 2018) as a rather simplistic way of324
attributing specific thoughts to them. To investigate this possibility, Study 2 explored325
how perceivers explicitly rated target expressions (positive or negative) to determine326
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if the pattern of such judgments could reductively explain their inferences of target327
inner states. If not, then presumably perceivers are doing something more than merely328
classifying target expressions when asked to infer target inner states. Specifically, if329
perceivers merely classified target expressions as a strategy for making judgments330
without needing to infer target inner states, they would identify a positive expression331
when the target thought about either a happy or a grateful event, and identify a332
negative expression when the target recalled either an angry or a sad experience. If so,333
then perceivers’ ratings of target expressions would be indistinguishable from their334
inferences of targets’ inner states (Kang et al, 2018). The purpose of Study 2 was to335
investigate this possibility.336
Participants337
Fifty college students (22 males; M = 20 years) in Zhanjiang China voluntarily338
participated as perceivers. None had participated in Study 1. The sample size was339
determined using the G*Power 3, affording 95% power to detect a medium effect on340
the within-subjects factors. None of the perceivers had prior acquaintance with any of341
the targets. Four additional females were excluded for quitting in the middle of the342
task.343
Procedure344
The procedure was similar to Study 1 except after viewing each target video, the345
perceiver rated the target’s expression on a five-point scale (from negative to346
positive). The perceiver registered his/her judgment by using the keyboard to select347
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the number ‘1, 2, 3 4 or 5’ for the corresponding responses. Perceivers typically348
needed about 45 minutes to complete the task.349
Results and Discussion350
Table 2 summarizes perceivers’ mean ratings of target expressions for each of the351
four states (Happy, Grateful, Angry, Sad) in each of the three target EQ groups, along352
with the corresponding one-sample t tests (comparing the means of expression ratings353
against the neutral point 3). The data show that perceivers generally rated target354
expressions positively when targets had been thinking of a time they felt happy;355
perceivers generally rated targets neutral when targets had been thinking of a time356
they felt grateful, and perceivers generally rated target expressions negatively when357
targets had been thinking of events that made them feel sad and angry. A one-way358
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a significant difference in ratings of target359
expressions among the four events targets were cued to think about: Greenhouse-360
Geisser adjusted F (2.22, 108.91) = 1991.22, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 6.31. Post hoc361
LSD tests suggest targets were rated most positively when thinking of something362
happy (ps < .001) and most negatively when thinking of something sad (ps < .001);363
target expressions were rated more positively when thinking of a time they felt364
grateful than when thinking of a time they felt angry (p = .002).365
Table 2 about here366
As revealed in Table 2 and Figure 2, perceivers generally rated targets as having367
positive expressions when they (the targets) were thinking of something happy and368
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rated targets as having negative expressions when they (the targets) were thinking of369
something sad, regardless of target EQs. When targets were thinking of a time they370
felt grateful, perceivers rated those targets with high EQ positively but rated those371
with either low or average EQ negatively. Surprisingly, perceivers rated targets with372
average EQ as having positive expressions when those targets were thinking of an373
event that made them feel angry. In short, ratings of target expressions were374
influenced by target EQ status as well as the kind of event the target was thinking375
about – but the pattern formed by these ratings was quite different than would have376
been expected if perceivers were making a simplistic link between the valence and377
strength of target expressions and what targets were thinking.378
Figure 2 about here379
To confirm the above results, we carried out a 3 × 4 repeated-measures ANOVA,380
with the three target EQ groups and the four kinds of event targets were thinking381
about (Happy, Grateful, Sad, and Angry) as within-subjects factors. Results showed382
main effects related to the three target EQ groups (Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F383
(1.59, 77.70) = 2627.28, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 7.11) and what targets had been asked384
to think about (Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F (2.22, 108.91) = 1991.22, p < .001,385
Cohen’s f = 6.19), and a significant interaction between the two factors (Greenhouse-386
Geisser adjusted F (2.02, 99.17) = 1019.67, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 4.43).387
Simple-effect analyses for the interaction between the EQ groups and the four388
kinds of target thought revealed the following results. Firstly, in each EQ group,389
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perceivers rated the valence of target expressions differently according to what targets390
had been asked to think about: for the low EQ group, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F391
(1.50, 73.58) = 681.74, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 3.62; for the average EQ group,392
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F (1.60, 78.48) = 1182.54, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 4.77;393
for the high EQ group, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F (2.03, 99.37) = 1862.83, p394
< .001, Cohen’s f = 5.99. Secondly, for each kind of target thought, perceivers rated395
target expressivity differently between the three EQ groups: for happiness,396
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F (1.73, 84.81) = 861.31, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 4.07);397
for gratitude, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F (1.54, 75.62) = 3840.31, p < .001,398
Cohen’s f = 8.59; for sadness, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted F (1.32, 64.63) = 144.15,399
p < .001, Cohen’s f = 1.66; for anger, (F (2, 98) = 475.40, p < .001, Cohen’s f = 3.02.400
To examine how perceiver ratings of target expressions for each kind of target401
thought depends on target EQs, post hoc LSD tests were carried out on the main402
effects associated with kind of target thought. Results were as follows: (1) when403
targets were thinking of a time they felt happy, perceivers rated their expressions404
more positively if they were in the average EQ group than if they were in the low and405
high EQ groups (ps < .001); (2) when targets were thinking of a time they felt406
grateful, perceivers rated their expressions most positively when those targets were in407
the high EQ group (ps < .001), and more positively when they were in the low EQ408
group than in the average EQ group (p = .001); when targets were thinking of a time409
they felt sad, perceivers rated their expressions most positively when they were in the410
high EQ group (ps < .001), and rated equally those in the low EQ and the average EQ411
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groups; when targets were thinking of a time they felt angry, perceivers rated them412
more positively when those targets were in the average EQ group than when they413
were in the other two groups (ps < .001), and more positively in the high EQ group414
than in the low EQ group (p < .001).415
General Discussion416
Study 2 revealed that perceivers rated target expressions most positively when417
those targets were thinking of a time they felt happy; they rated targets most418
negatively when those targets were thinking of a time they felt sad. Consistent with419
this, Study1 showed that perceivers were generally able to detect the thoughts of420
targets when they were recalling either a happy or a sad event. Taken in isolation,421
these associations raise the possibility that perceivers based their judgments of target422
inner states on their classification of target facial expressions (but see Kang et al,423
2018).424
However, perceivers’ ratings of target expressions (Study 2) were rather different425
than their inferences of target thoughts (Study 1) in many other respects. For example,426
in spite of rating target expressions positively when those targets had high EQ and427
were cued to think of a time they felt happy and a time they felt grateful, perceivers428
were inaccurate in inferring thoughts of happiness and gratitude (Study 1); but429
perceivers were more accurate in inferring that targets were thinking of a time they430
felt grateful if those targets had low EQ. In addition, perceivers rated expressions431
most positively for those targets who were in the average EQ group when thinking of432
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a time they felt happy; but they were most accurate in inferring happy thoughts in the433
low EQ target group (in Study 1). Perceivers generally rated expressions negatively434
when targets were thinking of a time they felt sad and yet were accurate in inferring435
the thoughts of sadness specifically in targets located in the high EQ group. In436
summary, nuances in the pattern of perceivers’ accurate inferences of four kinds of437
target inner states across three target groups who differed in their EQ is far from fully438
illuminated by perceivers’ ratings of target expressions. In short, it seems perceiver439
inferences of target inner states amounts to more than merely rating expressions as440
positive or negative, a conclusion which is highly consistent with that drawn by Kang441
et al. (2018). Presumably, then, the quality rather than the valence/ strength of target442
expression is what signals their inner states. Precisely what form these signals take is443
beyond the scope of the design and methods of the current study and remains444
something to pursue in future research.445
Nevertheless, the results offer new information concerning people’s ability to446
read others’ minds and we shall summarise the highlights. Although there was an447
equal number of each of the four target events presented, perceivers did not impute an448
equal number of states; rather, they were biased to judge that targets were recalling a449
sad event. According to West and Kenny (2011), many findings in mindreading450
research are unclear in cases where biased responding might be an issue. According to451
them, the problem can only be solved by satisfying the ‘truth condition’ such that a452
measure of mindreading accuracy can be separated from response bias. The ‘truth453
condition’, as they define it, is satisfied if we can compare the perceiver’s judgment454
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against an objective fact and our method was designed to do this. Specifically, when455
the perceiver judged, for example, that the target had been asked to think of456
something that made them feel grateful, we can then compare this judgment against457
the objective fact of whether or not the target was actually asked to think of458
something that made them feel grateful. Using the method of SDT for coding data459
controls for biased responding and uneven base rates; it is then possible to focus on460
mindreading accuracy that stands apart from issues with base-rate bias.461
Using an unbiased measure (SDT) of mindreading accuracy, the results revealed462
notable performance in that by observing a short silent video of targets, the perceivers463
were systematically able to determine whether those targets were thinking of464
something happy and something that made them feel sad. The targets were merely465
sitting quietly while thinking: They were not asked to act in any way, they were not466
communicating and they were not engaging with anything external. The results are467
thus striking in showing that perceivers can observe somebody who is sitting quietly468
and guess what they are thinking. In addition, because the method and data-coding469
allows us to separate response-bias from mindreading accuracy, the findings reported470
here are perhaps the strongest and clearest demonstration to date of this aspect of471
human ability (cf Teoh et al, 2017).472
We assume that the target’s thought leaked out into their behaviour, taking the473
form of a mind that was perceptible to the perceiver. The perceivers then presumably474
translated by way of inference, more or less precisely, the observable target behaviour475
into an internal target state (Gallese & Goldman, 1998). It could have been that476
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perceivers were only crudely able to discriminate between occasions when targets477
were thinking of something positive and something negative, but nothing more478
precise, as was the case in past research (North, Todorov, & Osherson, 2010;479
Valanides et al., 2017). Impressively, though, the results here show that perceivers480
demonstrated levels of accuracy in a finer-grained four-way discrimination.481
The finding that mindreading accuracy varies depending on the EQ status of the482
target supports Wu et al.’s (2016a & 2016b) general prediction that targets located at483
various points along the continuum might possess minds that vary in their level of484
readability. However, Wu et al. had not considered the possibility that target485
readability depends on their EQ status in combination with the particular content of486
thought targets were experiencing. Hence, the results reveal a complexity in the487
demands placed on perceivers that had not previously been anticipated or considered.488
Those with low EQ were most readable while those with high EQ were least readable:489
Why do specifically positive thoughts leak out as an interpretable signal more lucidly490
in targets with low EQ than in targets with high EQ? Perhaps positive thoughts have a491
different content or quality in those with low EQ compared with those who have high492
EQ – indeed, perhaps targets differed in their willingness or ability to think of493
something on cue, depending on their EQ status. It will surely be a challenge for494
future research to detail a link between thought content, quality of signal and EQ495
status in targets.496
According to the ‘lens model’ (Back, Schmukle, & Egloff, 2011), accuracy in497
mindreading might be decided by the clues related with different factors—the target,498
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the perceiver and the interaction between them. In terms of the targets, they might499
behave in different ways depending on how empathizing they are. For example, the500
targets might emit different kinds of signals, including facial expressivity and bodily501
movements. Low EQ targets might show more positive signals when thinking502
something positive while high EQ targets might emit rather strong negative signals503
when recalling a sad event. Further research could test such possibilities by coding504
targets’ signals (facial expressions and bodily movements) and explore the ways by505
which they play a role in perceiver judgments of target minds. Another possibility is506
that perceivers might have adopted different strategies to interpret targets with507
different levels of EQ. Future research could employ eye-tracking along with508
behavioural measurements to examine whether or not perceivers use different509
strategies to observe targets with different EQ levels.510
Previous studies have demonstrated perceiver abilities to detect which situation511
caused a target’s reaction (Pillai et al., 2012, 2014; Cassidy et al., 2013, 2015;512
Sheppard et al., 2016; Teoh et al., 2017), to infer how others felt (Zaki et al., 2008;513
2009), to infer what another person is thinking (Ickes et al., 1990; Valanides et al.,514
2017), and to judge where a stranger is located along trait continua (Wu et al., 2016a,515
2017); the current research expanded these findings by suggesting perceiver capability516
in inferring specified target thoughts, and the accuracy of such mindreading, was517
affected by target EQ status as well as the events experienced by the target.518
519
520
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Tables631
Table 1. Means and standard deviations (SD) of hit rates (MHR), false alarm rates (MFAR), d-632
prime (Md’), criterion (Mc) of each mental state across the three target EQ groups and within633
each target EQ group, along with t values of one-sample t tests for d’ (comparing with 0), 95%634









H .27 (.10) .22 (.08) .17 (.29) .73 (.28) [.09, .25] 4.24*** .57
G .25 (.12) .24 (.08) 0 (.34) .74 (.32) [-.09, .10] .04 0
A .22 (.08) .21 (.07) .03 (.29) .83 (.24) [-.06, .11] .63 .10
S .35 (.10) .31 (.10) .11 (.26) .45 (.24) [.04, .19] 3.13** .42
Low EQ H .29 (.13) .17 (.10) .48 (.42) .82 (.38) [.36, .59] 8.25*** 1.14
G .30 (.18) .23 (.09) .17 (.53) .68 (.37) [.02, .32] 2.31* .32
A .21 (.12) .20 (.08) -.03 (.51) .89 (.30) [-.17, .12] -.69 -.06
S .36 (.15) .35 (.14) .03 (.47) .40 (.33) [-.10, .16] .42 .06
Average
EQ
H .28 (.14) .22 (.09) .18 (.45) .71 (.28) [.06, .30] 2.91** .40
G .26 (.15) .22 (.11) .08 (.51) .77 (.38) [-.06, .22] 1.10 .16
A .23 (.11) .21 (.08) .05 (.35) .82 (.32) [-.05, .15] 1.03 .14
S .34 (.13) .31 (.09) .10 (.39) .48 (.26) [-.01, .21] 1.76 .26
High EQ H .23 (.15) .30 (.11) -.25 (.53) .70 (.36) [-.40, -.11] -3.47*** -.47
G .17 (.13) .26 (.11) -.33 (.55) .86 (.33) [-.48, -.18] -4.31*** -.60
A .25 (.16) .21 (.07) .08 (.50) .79 (.34) [-.06, .22] 1.20 .16
S .35 (.15) .26 (.13) .25 (.49) .57 (.37) [.11, .39] 3.67*** .51
637
Notes: p* < .05, p** < .01, p*** ≤.001; Cohen’s d = 0.2, 0.5 and 0.8 respectively represents small,638
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Table 2. Means of perceiver ratings (MR) and standard deviations (SD) of each mental state in645
each target EQ group and across the three EQ groups, along with t values of one-sample t tests646
(comparing with the neutral point 3), 95% confidence intervals (95% CIs) of each MR and647
Cohen’s d in Study 2648
649
Target EQs States MR (SD) 95% CIs t Cohen’s d
Across three
EQs
H 3.10 (.03) [3.09, 3.11] 27.16* -3.33
G 3.00 (.02) [3.00, 3.01] .39 0
A 2.96 (.02) [2.96, 2.97] -49.59* -2.00
S 2.86 (.02) [2.86, 2.87] -17.57* -7.00
Low EQ H 3.04 (.03) [3.04, 3.05] 11.28* 1.33
G 2.84 (.03) [2.83, 2.85] -35.20* -5.33
A 2.84 (.02) [2.84, 2.85] -52.70* -8.00
S 2.82 (.03) [2.81, 2.83] -37.19* -6.00
Average EQ H 3.23 (.03) [3.22, 3.24] 52.85* 7.67
G 2.81 (.04) [2.80, 2.82] -33.48* -4.75
A 3.04 (.03) [3.03, 3.05] 10.14* 1.33
S 2.83 (.05) [2.81, 2.84] -22.45* -3.40
High EQ3 H 3.04 (.04) [3.03, 3.05] 6.68* 1.00
G 3.35 (.02) [3.34, 3.35] 107.30* 17.50
A 3.00 (.04) [2.99, 3.01] .03 0
S 2.94 (.01) [2.94, 2.94] -30.26* -6.00
650







































































Figure 1. Mean accuracy (d-prime) of perceivers' inferences of
the target mental states (happiness, gratitude, anger, and sadness)
in each target EQ group in Study 1. Error bars represent standard






































Figure 2. Mean perceiver ratings of target expressions as targets were
thinking of the four events in each target EQ group in Study 2. Error bars
represent standard error of the mean with 95% confidence interval.
Low EQ
Average EQ
High EQ
